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SUMMARYThe financial crisis, which is now hitting the new member states
severely, highlights the shortcomings of the existing institutional architec-
ture in Europe. Current strains reflect a revaluation of risks but they also
result from policy mistakes. For many years, growth in the new member
states has relied on massive inflows of foreign capital that are now being
called into question. Some of the non euro-area new member states suffer
from serious vulnerabilities, to which policy has been slow to respond.
Crisis management in the euro area has also had the unintended conse-
quence of putting non euro-area new member states at a disadvantage.
These are unhealthy developments and without decisive action, a new
political and economic divide within Europe may emerge.
POLICY CHALLENGE
In the short run, the ECB should provide temporary currency swaps to non
euro-area new member states. It should also consider accepting non-euro
denominated government bonds as eligible securities for its repurchase
transactions. In the medium run, proper enforcement of the EU single mar-
ket and competition rules will be of major
importance in maintaining the integrity of
the European single market and more
effective surveillance is also needed. The
EIB and the EBRD should also increase
their lending to new member states.
Countries in fixed exchange-rate systems
in need of real exchange-rate adjustment
should if possible build social consensus
to cut nominal wages. More fundamentally,
policy-makers in the euro area cannot
afford to overlook the consequences of
their actions for neighbouring countries.
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AVOIDING A NEW EUROPEAN DIVIDE
Note: Countries are ordered according to their CA/GDP ratio. CA, net FDI and budget balance are in % of GDP and the rest are in percent (annual average
for credit growth, inflation and GDP growth). Credit growth is nominal, GDP growth is real. Source: Eurostat, IMF, ECB.
Table 1
Financial integration and main macroeconomic indicators of the CEE members of the EU
CA, 2002-07
Net FDI,
2002-07
Credit growth,
2002-07
Foreign bank
ownership of
banks, 2005
Share of
foreign currency
loans, 2007
Inflation,
2002-07
Budget
balance,
2002-07
GDP growth,
2002-07
Latvia -14.4 4.8 44.3 53.2 86.3 5.8 -0.9 9.1
Estonia -12.3 6.9 32.7 99.2 80.0 3.9 2.0 9.0
Bulgaria -11.1 11.6 33.8 73.0 50.1 5.9 1.4 5.9
Lithuania -8.6 3.4 41.4 92.0 54.8 2.1 -1.2 7.8
Romania -8.3 6.0 46.2 63.0 54.3 11.7 -1.8 6.2
Hungary -6.9 2.5 16.7 82.0 57.1 5.3 -7.5 4.0
Slovakia -5.5 7.5 8.4 97.4 20.4 4.7 -3.7 6.1
Czech Republic -4.2 5.4 10.2 93.4 12.9 1.8 -4.1 4.5
Poland -3.0 3.0 13.9 67.1 23.6 2.1 -4.5 4.4
Slovenia -1.8 0.9 19.4 34.0 NA 4.3 -1.7 4.0
crisis initially affected the
advanced economies of western
Europe but had little direct effect
on the emerging economies of
central and eastern Europe. Things
have changed since mid-
September, however, and the crisis
now threatens to hit the newer EU
member states much more than
the older ones.
In the advanced economies of
Europe, the crisis began in August
2007 with the drying up of liquidi-
ty in money markets and lingered
for a year until it took a turn for the
worse following the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in September
2008.
The crisis in the new member
states developed differently. Until
September 2008 the region – like
other emerging countries – did not
experience any major turbulence,
partly because banks in the new
member states had negligible toxic
assets and financial innovation
was scarce. This was remarkable
as many countries in the region
exhibited significant macroeco-
nomic imbalances (Table 1). Only
Latvia suffered considerable
institutions and the economies of
the euro area. But, for their part,
euro-area observers often high-
light the vulnerabilities the non
euro-area new member states
have accumulated and perceive
their policy responses to the crisis
as inappropriate or inadequate.
Looking ahead, the emergence of a
new economic and political divide
within Europe has become a
distinct possibility. This risk is not
currently being heeded.
An accurate diagnosis entails dis-
tinguishing between perception
and reality – even when, as here,
data is scarce. In what follows, we
start with a short recap of crisis
developments in Europe. Section 2
deals with the channels of trans-
mission of the crisis. Section 3
assigns responsibilities. Section 4
offers policy recommendations.
Section 5 concludes with some
broader issues raised by the crisis.
1. CRISIS DEVELOPMENTS: FROM
DECOUPLING TO BEING ‘IN SYNC’
For a time, we saw decoupling at
work within Europe. The financial
A CRISIS REVEALS FAULT LINES in
the apparently most solid
institutions. This has been the
case for private institutions and is
also true for public ones, including
the EU itself.
Since autumn 2008, the highly
successful and seemingly smooth
process of integration, growth and
catch-up of the new EU member
states of central and eastern
Europe is suddenly looking more
fragile. Crisis and severe adjust-
ment in Hungary and Latvia have
highlighted the more general issue
of the stability of the region’s
economies. And the asymmetry
between the countries who benefit
from the shelter effect of the euro
and those who do not in broad
terms reinforces the divide
between the two parts of the EU.
The management of the crisis in
both parts of the EU involves the
risk of economic and political ten-
sion. Since events took a turn for
the worse in September, euro-area
crisis management has often been
perceived in central and eastern
Europe as biased towards the
interests of the financialAVOIDING A NEW EUROPEAN DIVIDE
b
r
u
e
g
e
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
b
r
i
e
f 03
116
112
108
104
100
96
92
88
2
 
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
 
2
0
0
8
 
=
 
1
0
0
0
2
/
0
1
/
0
8
1
3
/
0
2
/
0
8
2
7
/
0
3
/
0
8
1
2
/
0
5
/
0
8
2
5
/
0
6
/
0
8
0
8
/
0
8
/
0
8
2
3
/
0
9
/
0
8
0
6
/
1
1
/
0
8
1
7
/
1
2
/
0
8
Hungary
Romania
Czech Republic
Poland
Slovakia
Figure 1:
Nominal exchange rates against the euro, 2 January - 17 December 2008
Note: an increase in the index indicates appreciation against the euro. Source: ECB.
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Figure 2: 3-month interbank offered interest rates, 2 January - 17 December 2008
Note: the Romanian rate peaked at 49.81 percent on 20 October 2008, but for better readability of the right-hand panel the vertical axis has a 20 percent
cut-off.  Source: Datastream.
financial strain as early as 2007.
However the situation changed
dramatically in mid-September
2008. In most new member states
foreign currency financing dried
up, domestic interbank money
markets stumbled, bond spreads
and credit default swaps on
government debt deteriorated
sharply, and currencies came
under pressure (Figures 1 and 2). 
The deterioration was sharp
enough to necessitate strong and
immediate policy responses: in
October, Hungary entered into an
IMF-led agreement and Latvia also
started discussions with the Fund.
2. CHANNELS OF TRANSMISSION
Through which channels was the
crisis transmitted to the non euro-
area new member states? And to
what extent did the European
framework and the way the crisis
was managed in the euro area mit-
igate or amplify the crisis in the
non euro-area new member
states?
Mitigating factors
EU membership. EU membership
has certainly served to strengthen
the new member states. It has
helped to make policy institutions
in the new member states
stronger, has enhanced their cred-
ibility and symbolises the irre-
versible character of integration
between the formerly separate
parts of Europe.b
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Figure 3:
Cost of insurance against government default and the current account
Note: A credit default swap (CDS) is a credit derivative contract between two counterparties. The
buyer makes periodic payments to the seller, and in return receives a payoff if the underlying
financial instrument defaults. CDS values for December 2008 refer to the average of the first two
weeks of this month. Annual values are shown for the current account; 2008 values are forecasts by
the DG ECFIN of the EC. CDS data are not available for Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg. Source: Authors’
calculation using data from Datastream and the DG ECFIN of the EC.
Foreign ownership of banks in the
new member states. About 70
percent of the banks in central and
eastern Europe are owned by
western European banks; in some
countries their share is even close
to 100 percent (Table 1). The com-
mitment not to let any systemical-
ly important bank fail in the euro
area also helped their subsidiaries
in the new member states. Without
western ownership banks in the
region would probably have been
denied euro liquidity altogether.
EU participation in multilateral
crisis lending.Hungary has agreed
a €20 billion financing package
from the IMF, EU and the World
Bank. The larger-than-expected
package and the participation of
the EU alongside the two
international organisations signal
international determination to
combat contagion of the financial
crisis from one country to the
other.
Repurchase agreements between
the ECB and central banks.A facili-
ty introduced by the ECB on 16
October 2008 (for Hungary) and
21 November 2008 (for Poland)
helped Hungarian and Polish com-
mercial banks to roll over through
their central banks their existing
swaps that they had previously
rolled over with euro-area commer-
cial banks.
Amplifying factors
Flight to quality.The flight to qual-
ity, typically into US and German
government securities and bank
deposits, reflecting the credibility
of institutions and guarantees,
affected most emerging countries
and even some euro-area
members. But country-specific
vulnerabilities did play a role, as
indicated by the correlation
between the cost of credit default
swaps (CDS) and current account
deficits (Figure 3). While this cor-
relation was present before the
crisis, the relationship has
recently become starker.
Uncoordinated sequence of
deposit guarantee upgrades.
Starting in September 2008 euro-
area governments substantially
increased their deposit
guarantees (some are unlimited),
though this was initially done in an
uncoordinated fashion. Later on,
joint decisions were made and
governments in the new member
states also introduced such meas-
ures. But the uncoordinated
sequence of deposit guarantees in
the EU may have compounded the
effects of uneven credibility and
flight to quality.
Asymmetric liquidity and credit
management. In times of stress
liquidity management and credit
distribution decisions are not only
driven by long-term profit maximi-
sation. While western European
parent banks did provide contin-
ued access to liquidity for sub-
sidiaries, anecdotal evidence
suggests that in periods of height-
ened stress some of them have pri-
oritised hoarding liquidity at home.
Banks may also curtail credit
asymmetrically in the future. ThisAVOIDING A NEW EUROPEAN DIVIDE
b
r
u
e
g
e
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
b
r
i
e
f 05
could either be a rational response
to deteriorating economic condi-
tions in the new member states, or
a result of commitments to main-
tain or increase credit in the home
country as a counterpart to public
recapitalisation.
Restricted access to euro liquidi-
ty. The near-paralysis of the euro-
area interbank money market
implies that (especially non
foreign-bank owned) commercial
banks in the new member states
were largely cut off from euro liq-
uidity. Domestic central banks
could have provided euro liquidity
through drawing on their foreign
currency reserves, but in times of
crisis, this is not deemed sensible. 
Currency denomination of
government bonds. The list of
securities eligible for ECB refinanc-
ing does not include local
currency-denominated bonds
issued by the governments of the
non euro-area new member states.
While this was a perfectly natural
provision when the European
money markets worked smoothly,
the liquidity shortage has made it
unattractive for euro-area
financial institutions to hold non-
euro government bonds, thus con-
tributing to their sell-off.
Trade and FDI. The economies of
the new member states are heavi-
ly dependent on trade with the EU.
With the recession in the euro
area, exports from the new mem-
ber states will be hit hard. This fac-
tor is primarily of relevance in the
medium term but it may matter for
the current reassessment of the
region’s prospects.
Slow policy response in some new
member states.Last but not least,
cy about extremely large current-
account deficits and inaction in
the face of property booms. In the
case of Hungary, earlier fiscal
profligacy also played a role. These
factors all contributed to the vul-
nerability of the new member
states’ economies.
However, beyond individual finger-
pointing we would like to empha-
sise that one of the major lessons
of the current crisis is that it high-
lights significant shortcomings in
Europe’s existing institutional
architecture 
Financial integration
The financial systems of the new
member states have become
closely integrated with those of
the euro-area countries (Table 1). 
We argued in Section 2 that
western European ownership of
new member states’ banks had
both positive and negative effects
when the crisis hit. It also had a
role in the pervasive development
of foreign-currency loans to the
private sector that characterises
many countries in the region and
which are a well-documented
source of vulnerability.
The development of foreign-
currency financing has in fact
resulted from supply and demand
factors. On the supply side,
spreads between credit rates and
money-market rates made it a
lucrative business for banks,
which in part explains why sub-
sidiaries of western banks in the
new member states were highly
profitable. On the demand side,
high inflation and consequently
high nominal interest rates in
some member countries made
not all new member states have
introduced appropriate measures
to alleviate the effects of the crisis.
Both government (where the
budget allows) and central banks
could have done more to dampen
the effects of the crisis.
3. IS SOMEONE TO BLAME?
Spill-over effects are one thing,
assigning responsibility is anoth-
er. Can euro-area countries or the
EU be blamed for having con-
tributed to the crisis in the new
member states? Or should govern-
ments in the new member states
themselves be blamed for having
pursued past policies which led to
severe vulnerabilities and for hav-
ing made inappropriate policy
choices during the current crisis?
For some of the channels of trans-
mission of the crisis there is little
that governments, central banks
and supervisors in the euro area
could have done to mitigate their
effects. This applies especially to
the steep rise in risk aversion and
the weaker perceived credibility of
the new member states. However,
other action - or inaction – decided
upon in the heat of the crisis may
have had unintended conse-
quences. For example, the more
the ECB was (rightly) moving into
new territory to remedy the short-
age of liquidity in the euro area,
the more it was inadvertently put-
ting new member states’ banks –
at least those without access to a
parent bank’s liquidity – at disad-
vantage. The same logic applies to
the uncoordinated introduction of
deposit guarantees.
But the new member states bear
some of the blame themselves.
There was widespread complacen-AVOIDING A NEW EUROPEAN DIVIDE
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1This claim is not valid
for Bulgaria and
Romania, which joined
the EU in 2007.
foreign-currency borrowing attrac-
tive. Since the real exchange rate
of new member states’ currencies
was expected to appreciate as a
consequence of catching up, it
was rational for those households
and corporations that could man-
age any short-term exchange-rate
fluctuations to take on foreign
currency loans.
Looking ahead, a lesson from the
crisis is that foreign-currency bor-
rowing is a side-effect of financial
integration that involves signifi-
cant risks. Provided it is done in a
non-discriminatory way, limiting
the risks by containing such bor-
rowing can be regarded as a legiti-
mate policy objective.
Euro-area enlargement
Ten of the 12 new member states
could by now have joined the euro
area, had they met the admission
criteria
1. In fact, by January 2009,
four of them will indeed be part of
the euro area. Some of the others –
Poland for example – have made
the deliberate choice to postpone
membership. Others were rejected
(Lithuania) or discouraged from
applying, and the EU can certainly
be criticised for clinging to criteria
ill-suited to catching-up countries
(Pisani-Ferry  et al 2008, Darvas
and Szapáry 2008). Generally,
neither euro-area governments nor
European institutions expressed a
wish for speedy euro-area enlarge-
ment. So the blame, if any, for slow
euro-area enlargement must be
shared.
External stability concerns would
suggest early euro-area entry:
being inside a large currency area
helps considerably for small open
economies in times of crisis. But
the experience of the Czech
Republic and Slovakia, two
countries that have both main-
tained macroeconomic stability,
shows that such concerns are pri-
marily relevant for countries that
have accumulated domestic vul-
nerabilities. 
As for long-term growth and
macroeconomic management, the
crisis has also provided a new per-
spective.
On the one hand, if the operation of
financial markets and capital
flows normalises in the near
future, then the argument that
speedy euro-area enlargement
may not be in the best interests of
fast-moving catch-up economies
will prevail (Darvas and Szapary
2008). Entering the euro area
while the price catch-up is still far
from complete may result in an
excessively low real interest rate,
which may in turn favour excess
investment in property or unpro-
ductive capital. A severe adjust-
ment crisis is possible within the
euro area, too, as indicated by the
case of Ireland and Spain (Ahearne
et al, 2008) and Portugal.
On the other hand, for countries
not in the euro area, the crisis has
called into question the
sustainability of relying excessive-
ly on capital inflows. The risk that
these inflows will diminish in the
foreseeable future has increased
substantially. Countries whose
domestic investment is heavily
financed by capital inflows will
hence face the dilemma of either
staying out of the euro area and
risking low growth, or entering the
euro area and facing the risk of
boom and bust cycles. There is no
clear-cut and one-size-fits-all
solution to this dilemma.
A special case applies to those
countries in fixed exchange-rate
systems. These countries are
caught in a trap now. Given the
large share of foreign-currency
lending, an abandonment of the
peg followed by sharp depreciation
would have a devastating effect.
However, under a fixed exchange
rate the reduction in current
account deficits made necessary
by the reversal of private capital
flows will probably imply severe
recession, unless domestic prices
and wages are sufficiently flexible.
This macroeconomic dilemma is
bound to dominate policy choices.
It would not be solved by early
entry into the euro area.
European surveillance
Finally, the current crisis high-
lights the shortcomings of the
European surveillance system. EU
institutions anticipated that, at
some point, countries which had
accumulated serious vulnerabili-
ties would face severe adjust-
ments and they did express con-
cern, but the institutional frame-
work failed to deliver strong
enough warnings to prompt timely
remedial action. When the crisis
hit, it was the IMF which had to
play the key role in the design and
financing of the rescue packages.
4. RECOMMENDATIONS
We first suggest that the following
action should be taken as soon as
possible.
1. Swap agreements. The ECB
should introduce temporary
reciprocal currency arrange-
ments (swap lines, Box 1) withAVOIDING A NEW EUROPEAN DIVIDE
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BOX 1: CURRENCY SWAPS BETWEEN CENTRAL BANKS VERSUS ERM-II
FACILITIES AND BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS ASSISTANCE
A currency swap is a foreign-exchange agreement between two par-
ties to exchange a given amount of one currency for a given amount of
another and, after a specified period of time, to give back the original
amounts swapped. Each party remains responsible for its own assets
and liabilities and hence none of them are exposed to foreign-
exchange risk.
Such an arrangement between the ECB and a national central bank
would not entail a default risk for the ECB unless one attaches a non-
zero probability of a foreign-exchange payment default. The arrange-
ment would temporarily help a national central bank to provide euro
liquidity to its banking system without drawing on its reserves.
Currency swaps should not be confused with the already existing
short-term financing facility available for ERM-II participants to sup-
port the stability of the exchange rate.
Currency swaps should also not be confused with the already existing
longer-term balance-of-payments assistanceto a country to help it to
rebuild foreign-exchange reserves. The EU has a medium-term
financial assistance facility for non euro-area member states, estab-
lished in 2002 with a limit that was raised to €25 billion on 25
November 2008.
central banks of the new mem-
ber states to provide them with
euro liquidity against their own
currencies, as it did for the
Danish central bank (on 27
October 2008) and as the US
Fed did for 14 central banks.
2. Wider collateral.The ECB should
temporarily accept as eligible
securities for its repurchase
transactions with counterpar-
ties government bonds issued
not only in euros, but also in the
domestic currencies of new
member states. This move
would be an extension of the
ECB’s recent decision to accept
low-quality securities as collat-
eral. The ECB should not take
exchange-rate risk, hence it
should apply an appropriate
haircut to non-euro sovereign
bonds to cover that risk. This
initiative would eliminate the
current strong incentive for
euro-area banks not to hold in
their portfolios domestic
currency-denominated
government bonds of new
member states.
3. Avoidance of asymmetric credit
constraints. Western European
governments and supervisors
should avoid measures that
would risk causing western-
owned banks in the new mem-
ber states to curtail credit
beyond what is justified by eco-
nomic and financial develop-
ments in the relevant market.
4. Policy action within the new
member states. Central banks
and governments in the new
member states should prevent
credit contraction and provide a
fiscal boost where budgets
allow.
Whereas the above initiatives
would address the immediate
risks, more permanent responses
should also be discussed and
implemented. These are in
particular: 
1. More effective surveillance. EU
surveillance should be
strengthen with a view to fos-
tering early diagnosis of vulner-
abilities and remedial action. 
2. Level playing field.The enforce-
ment of the EU single market
and competition rules is of
major importance in maintain-
ing the integrity of the
European single market.
Governments should avoid sub-
sidies or moral suasion which
may distort trade or discourage
foreign direct investments in
the new member states.
3. European financial supervi-
sion. The asymmetry in bank
ownership highlighted by the
crisis further underlines the
need for EU-wide supervision of
banks with significant cross-
border activities, as already
suggested for other reasons
(Véron, 2007).
4. EU-wide coordination of
guarantees. A permanent
mechanism should be estab-
lished to ensure coordination of
bank deposit guarantees in the
EU and to avoid an unfair
advantage accruing to early
movers.b
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5. EBRD and EIB financing. The
EBRD and EIB should increase
their financing to the non euro-
area new member states in
recognition of the shortcom-
ings in European financial inte-
gration evident in times of
crisis.
6. Real exchange-rate adjust-
ment. Countries that operated
fixed exchange-rate systems
and accumulated huge foreign-
currency liabilities may not
need to introduce a floating
exchange-rate regime because
of the possibility of severe over-
shooting in exchange-rate
depreciation, but should find
other means to facilitate real
exchange-rate adjustment.
Where feasible, a social
consensus to cut nominal
wages would be less painful
than other available options.
5. CONCLUSION
Four important broader issues
emerge from our analysis.
First, when the crisis intensified,
the euro area understandably gave
priority to coordinating decisions
among the participant countries
and with the ECB. But the euro area
institutions now need to recognise
that the consequences of their
actions are not confined to the
boundaries of the euro area and
take their broader effects into
account when taking decisions.
Second, the current crisis has fun-
damentally called into question,
for countries not in the euro area,
the growth model that relied on
substantial capital inflows. This
new context calls for policy adjust-
ments in the new member states,
but also for EU responses to foster
continued financial integration
and a resumption of capital flows.
Avoidance of any measure tending
towards market fragmentation is
of utmost importance. 
Third, the debate over euro-area
enlargement needs to be seen in a
new light. But it has not become
any simpler. Although previous
arguments against early adoption
given the risk of creating boom-
bust cycles remain valid, the
attractiveness of joining the euro
area has increased substantially
for countries that rely heavily on
capital inflows. At the same, how-
ever, those same countries may
need an adjustment in their real
exchange rate in order to bring
about a reduction in their current-
account deficits.
Finally, a crisis is a defining
moment that shapes future atti-
tudes. It is too early to say what
lessons will be drawn from the
current crisis but they will certain-
ly have lasting consequences.
While the responsibility for the
current problems does all not lie
on one side, the perception has
developed in some new member
states that solidarity is in short
supply when crisis strikes. To cor-
rect this perception, individual
governments and the EU need to
discuss the contentious issues
openly and ensure that they draw
common, rather than divergent,
conclusions. If they do this, we
may avoid creating a new divide
within Europe.
The authors wish to thank colleagues and
friends who kindly commented on an
earlier draft of this paper, and Maite de
Sola for excellent research assistance.
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